Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

State of Utah v. Bennett Merl Belwood : Appellant's Answer To
Respondent's Petition For Rehearing

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Robert Van Sciver; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Utah v. Belwood, No. 12548 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5476

This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

BENNETT MERL BELWOOD,

Cue No.
19161

Defendant-AppeUxmt.

Appellant's Answer to Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVIDS. YOUNG
Chief Assistant
Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Asaistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Cit)", Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

!tOBDT VAN SCIVER
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City,
Attorney for Appellaat

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF CASE .............................................. I

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL ............................ I
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ............ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT PROPERLY
RULED THAT THE PROSECUTION
EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF CROSSEXAMIN ATION ................................................... 2
POINT II. APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF A PROSPECTIVE JUROR. ........ 3
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 5

CASES CITED
State vs. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865 (1905)..

2

State vs. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 P. 434 (1910) ..........

2

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-24-9 (1953) ....

2

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
12548

vs.

BENNETT MERL BELWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appellant's Answer to Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Bennett M. Belwood, was tried on a
charge of First Degree Murder in the Third District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. He was found
guilty as charged and he appealed to this Court.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
This Court remanded the case for a new trial. The
Respondent subsequently filed a Petition for Rehearing.
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT
Appellant seeks a dismissal of Respondent's Peti·
tion for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
THE PROSECUTION EXCEEDED THE
BOUNDS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION.
In Point I of Respondent's Brief for Rehearing, it
is contended that State vs. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P.
865 (1905) and State vs. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 P. 434
(1910) are not applicable to the instant case. This contention is clearly without merit.
In Shockley, the cross-examination of the accused
exceeded permissable bound in that the accused was
asked if he had committed certain criminal acts. The Respondent in the instant case argues that Shockley has
been changed by Section 78-24-9, U.C.A. 1953. This
argument is without merit because Section 78-24-9 relates only to questioning as to prior conviction. More
importantly, even if Respondent were correct in arguing
that the specific holding in Shockley has been changed
by statute, that case is still good law for the broader
proposition that it is error to cross-examine an accused
with questions which do not
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... refer to any fact or circumstance testified to
by him, or that come within the range of his examination in chief ...
and this is particularly true where such questions
were evidently intended to prejudice him before
the jury. 80 P. at 873.
The cross-examination of the Appellant in the instant case clearly comes within the prohibition announced in Shockley, and this Court is correct in ordering a new trial on that basis.
Respondent also contends that the Court in Vance,
supra, did not directly rule on the issue of certain crossexamination. This contention is likewise without merit.
Although other error existed in Vance, the Court clearly
ruled that the cross-examination under its consideration
was in error.
The cross-examination ruled on in Vance is analogous in its underlying strategy and prejudicial effect to
the cross-examination in the instant case, and Vance is
appropriate authority for the order of this Court granting a new trial in the instant case.

POINT II
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF A PROSPECTIVE JUROR.

A prospective juror, Mrs. Maass, was excluded
from Appellant's jury panel on the basis that she could
not make an unbiased determination of guilt.
Mrs. Maass stated that she could not form an opinion on the propriety of a recommendation for leniency
until she had heard all the facts, that she could see some
instances "where the death penalty would be justified'';
and she did not think she would return a verdict of second degree murder simply because the judge might not
follow a recommendation for leniency.
After making these statements, however, Mrs.
Maass indicated that she was confused by the District
Attorney's questioning. In the wake of this confusion,
the District Attorney asked the following lengthy and
highly compound question:
MR. BANKS: I'll try to make it a little simpler.
If you believed that the evidence showed a defendant to be guilty of murder in the first degree
beyond a reasonable doubt, and you knew that the
judge might not follow a recommendation of
leniency, rather than returning a verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree, would you return a
verdict of murder in the second degree because
you knew that that took it out of the judge's
hands?
Mrs. Maass answered "yes" to this question and she
was promptly excused for cause.
This exclusion for cause was improper and prejudicial to Appellant. The voir dire of Mrs. Maass, taken
as a whole, demonstrates that she would have made a
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conscious and thoughtful juror, but she was led into confusion by complex and abstract questioning which a layman could not possibly be expected to understand.
An examination of the entire sequence of Mrs.
Maass' examination indicates she would have been reluctant to make a recommendation of death, but might
have done so after considerable thought. Her examination does not establish any clear showing that she could
not make an unbiased determination of guilt.
The exclusion of Mrs. Maass was prejudicial error
and for the reasons stated in Point II of Appellant's original Brief on Appeal, this case should be remanded for
a new trial.

CONCLUSION
This Court properly ordered Appellant's case remanded for a new trial. Respondent's Petition for rehearing is without merit and should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VANSCIVER
321 South Sixth East

Salt Lake City, Utah
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